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WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS  
Kate Levine* 
 
 In March 2017, an employee of New York’s Civilian Complaint 
Review Board leaked the disciplinary record of Daniel Pantaleo to the 
media.1  Pantaleo, the police officer who choked Eric Garner to death in 
the video2 that went public and horrified many citizens, is under federal 
investigation3 after a Staten Island grand jury refused to indict him for 
Garner’s death.4  Legal Aid Society attorneys had unsuccessfully sought 
the release of his records in the courts for years.5  The leak of his records 
is the public face of an important but rarely discussed issue facing police, 
legislators, judges, lawyers, and scholars who care both about 
transparency for public servants and privacy for individual citizens:  how 
and when police should be forced to make their disciplinary records 
public. 
Issues surrounding police accountability are at the heart of both 
criminal and racial justice reform.  Very public debates are taking place 
about community policing, body cameras, prosecutions of individual 
officers, and race-based policing.6  Amidst these debates an equally 
important but quieter battle is being waged between the privacy of police 
officers and the transparency owed to the public. 
                                                
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. Thanks to Paul 
Pineau, Anna Roberts, Scott Skinner-Thompson, Jocelyn Simonson, and Rachel H. 
Smith for helpful conversations and comments, and to Veronika Alayeva for excellent 
research assistance.  
1  Jack Jenkins & Carimah Townes, Exclusive Documents: The Disturbing Secret 
History of the Officer who Killed Eric Garner, THINK PROGRESS, Mar. 21, 2017, 
https://thinkprogress.org/daniel-pantaleo-records-75833e6168f3#.rrhh7jycp. 
2  Video available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/dec/04/i-cant-
breathe-eric-garner-chokehold-death-video. 
3 See e.g., Rocco Parascondola, Two Cops Testify in Eric Garner Case at Brooklyn 
Federal Court, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24, 2017, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/brooklyn/cops-testify-eric-garner-case-brooklyn-federal-court-article-1.3007384. 
4 J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Waves of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict 
Officer In Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2014, at A1.  
5 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, N.Y. Appellate Court Refuses to Order Release of Eric 
Garner Grand Jury Materials, WASH. POST, July 29, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/29/n-y-
appellate-court-refuses-to-order-release-of-eric-garner-grand-jury-materials/. 
6 The sources for these debates are far too numerous for a short essay, but scholars have 
written extensively on each topic.  See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community 
Policing, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1593, 1628 (2002) (community policing); Howard M. 
Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 831, 836-37 
(2015) (body cameras); Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (2016) 
(prosecutions of police); Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African 
Americans to Police Violence?, 51 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 159 (2016) (race-based 
policing). 
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 In New York, this battle is over a little-discussed statute that 
protects the disciplinary records, and potentially other sources of 
information, of individual police officers.7  The statute, New York Civil 
Rights Law section 50a (hereinafter section 50-a), is at the heart of 
whether Daniel Pantaleo’s disciplinary record should be a matter of 
public record or remain private, given the backdrop of privacy concerns 
relating to the records of many government and all private employees.8  
 
 Beyond questions about Pantaleo’s record is a broader movement 
to repeal section 50-a, which scholars and civil rights lawyers contend is 
a barrier to police accountability, but police groups insist is an important 
protection for the privacy and safety of individual officers.  As can be 
said for many arguments surrounding policing, this debate pits central 
legal and theoretical principles against one another.  On the one hand is 
the importance of accountability and transparency to ensuring the 
working of our democratic system:  The police should be accountable to 
the public they serve, and many believe that there cannot be 
accountability without transparency.  On the other hand, there is the 
profound and ever-growing issue of privacy and control over one’s 
personal and professional information in a world where we are 
increasingly surveilled, exposed, and outed by government, social media, 
and corporate data entities.9  
 
                                                
7 There is very little academic writing on the subject, with two notable exceptions.  
Cynthia Conti Cook, an advocate and Legal Aid attorney, has both testified in favor of 
New York Civil Rights Law section 50’s repeal and written about the problems with the 
law in an academic publication. See Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public: 
Police Accountability in the Courtroom, 46 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1063, 1075 (2016); 
Jonathan Abel, Brady's Blind Spot:  Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files 
and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 743, 776 (2015) 
(reviewing all 50 states’ practices with regard to police misconduct and Brady 
obligations and arguing that police disciplinary records should be routinely made 
available to criminal defendants).   
8 There are far too many privacy-related statutes to mention here but two examples 
should serve.  New York Civil Rights Law section 50 protects not just police records, 
but also the records of firefighters, paramedics, and probation officers.  Additionally, all 
federal employees’ records are jealously guarded by federal statute.  Under 5 C.F.R. 
Part 293.311, other than basic identifying information, no federal employee’s 
information is released to any party without a summons, warrant, or subpoena. 
9 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, EXPOSED:  Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age, 
(Harv. U. Press, 2015) (discussing the ways in which modern behavior exposes us to 
surveillance); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 159, 161 
(2015) (arguing that there are constitutional limitations on the ability of the government 
to out or disclose intimate information).   
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 In this essay, I argue that the release of police disciplinary 
records requires balancing privacy and transparency values, which differ 
depending on when and to whom such records are released.  Implicit in 
this categorization is the belief that there is value in keeping certain 
information about police officers, even information that pertains to their 
official functions, private.  I will focus on section 50-a, although all 
states have some version of this law.  In Part I, I argue that the stated 
purpose of the law, to prevent defense attorneys from accessing police 
disciplinary records during a criminal trial, is the least compelling 
justification for police privacy.  In Part II, I will then argue that outside 
of the courtroom, the release of police records is a much closer question, 
one that pits privacy against transparency, not just for police officers, but 
also for many thousands of other government employees.  Finally, in 
Part III, I briefly gesture to the way the debate over police privacy 
dovetails with another criminal justice issue:  the privacy rights of 
formerly incarcerated individuals.  
 
I. Police Records in the Courtroom 
 
Section 50-a protects police and certain other public employees 
from the disclosure of their employment records.  Although every state 
has some variation of this law, New York’s statute is known to be among 
the most protective of officer privacy.10  It states that: 
 
All personnel records used to evaluate continued employment or 
promotion, under the control of any police agency . . . shall be 
considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review 
without the express written consent of such police officer . . . 
except as may be mandated by lawful court order.11 
As is clear from the quoted portion of the statute above, the default is 
privacy, not only in cases like Pantaleo’s, where the request is to make 
the record open to the entire public, but also when the request is from a 
criminal defendant in a trial where the officer’s credibility is central to 
the case.  In fact, the lobbying surrounding the law’s passage, reflected 
in the stated legislative intent of the law, was to stop defense attorneys 
                                                
10 COMM. ON OPEN GOV'T, STATE OF N.Y. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND STATE LEGISLATURE 3-5 (Dec. 2014), 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/coog/pdfs/2014AnnualReport.pdf (New York’s statute is among 
the most protective of police records). 
11 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2016). 
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from accessing the files of officers who would testify against their 
clients.12   
In numerous cases, New York courts have noted that the very 
purpose of the law is to stop defense attorneys from going on a “fishing 
expedition” into the record of an officer who has arrested or otherwise 
participated in the case against her client.13  Thus, the law insists that the 
accused have a “good faith . . . factual predicate” that the record contains 
“information, which, if known to the trier of fact, could very well affect 
the outcome of the trial.”14  The irony of this standard is immediately 
apparent:  a defendant must have knowledge that an officer’s disciplinary 
record will contain matters relevant to her case before getting a chance to 
review the file.  How can she know whether such material – kept secret 
from her, the judge in the case, and at times even the prosecutor – will 
contain relevant information?  Yet this is the hurdle she must overcome 
to be allowed to examine a police personnel record.  Moreover, the New 
York Police Department routinely opposes requests for such information, 
even opposing in camera review by a judge deciding the motion.15   
Judges, who could under the law review such records in camera as a 
routine, instead rely on prosecutors to disclose such material if they 
know and believe it to be material under their Brady obligation.16  While 
prosecutors have access to police records,17 there is no requirement that 
they examine such records, nor is scrutiny of records routinized by 
district attorneys’ offices.18  The Brady right has been criticized by many 
as too narrowly tailored, too favorable to prosecutors, and too easily 
eschewed by a prosecutor who wants to keep information from the 
defense or who through intentional or unintentional ignorance fails to 
discover exculpatory material to turn over to a defendant.  As David 
                                                
12 See People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 548 (1979) (discussing legislative intent 
of law).  
13 See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Waverly Police Dep't, 279 A.D.2d 833, 834 (App. Div. 3, 
2001) (“[The statute] is designed to eliminate fishing expeditions into police officers’ 
personnel files for collateral materials to be used for impeachment purposes . . . .”); 
Zarn v. City of N.Y., 198 A.D.2d 220, 220–21 (App. Div. 2, 1993) (same); Capital 
Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Burns, 109 A.D.2d 92, 95 (App. Div. 3, 1985), 
aff’d, 496 N.E.2d 665 (1986) (same).  
14 Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543 at 548. 
15 See Conti-Cook, supra note 7 at 1075 (noting that the law allows for in camera 
review but that this review is often opposed by the police department). 
16 Id. 
17 See Abel, supra note 7 at Part II (analyzing different states’ rules on prosecutors’ 
access to police files).  
18 Id. at 30 (discussing an interview with a District Attorney in New York, who 
admitted she had no formal system for learning impeachment evidence nor any plan to 
implement one). 
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Sklansky, a former federal prosecutor, puts it, the Brady standard should 
be a minimum for prosecutors deciding what information to turn over to 
a defendant in a criminal case because it often fails to encompass all of 
the relevant evidence that should be disclosed.19  Moreover, as I have 
noted in past articles, prosecutors have every incentive to avoid 
knowledge of police officer misconduct.  First, such misconduct might 
hurt her odds of a conviction in an individual criminal case.  Second, 
close scrutiny of an officer’s record might negatively impact not only a 
prosecutor’s all important relationship with that officer but also her 
relationship with other officers she will repeatedly need to work with in 
future cases.20  
 Despite the image that the term “fishing expedition” portrays, it 
is hard to imagine a less compelling privacy concern than that of a 
testifying officer in a criminal case.  First, numerous important 
constitutional rights weigh in favor of open access for criminal 
defendants.  These include the right to confront witnesses21 and the right 
to obtain any evidence that might be exculpatory. 22   And unlike 
prosecutors and judges, defense attorneys are the only actors in a 
criminal contest who will scrutinize an officer’s disciplinary record with 
their clients’ interest in mind.   
  
 As many scholars have noted, a criminal case is often a contest 
between police and defendant credibility.23  There are myriad cases when 
the police officer is the only witness to the alleged crime and the only 
source of information as to the officer’s own actions regarding a suspect  
– a person accused of trespassing late at night or burgling an empty store, 
for example.  Indeed, many drug cases are “buy and busts” in which 
police officers pose as drug buyers in order to arrest someone selling 
illegal narcotics, meaning that the officer and the defendant are the only 
witnesses.  Even in cases where there is evidence other than police 
testimony, police credibility may be all that stands between a defendant 
and conviction.  Evidence may only be introduced against a defendant at 
a trial if it was seized during a legal search or after a legal arrest.  At a 
hearing to challenge the introduction of such evidence, the only 
                                                
19 David Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
Online 25, 33-36 (2017). 
20 See Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1447, 1465-
70 
21 U.S. Const. Amend. VI (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him.”). 
22 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process requires prosecutors to turn over 
discoverable exculpatory material).  
23 See, e.g., Paul Butler, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (The New 
Press 2009) 102 (“One of your primary functions as a prosecutor is to make the judge 
and jury believe the police.”).   
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witnesses will often be the officers who conducted the search and arrest 
and the defendant.   
 
 At such a suppression hearing, the defense must argue that the 
police seized evidence or performed an arrest in violation of the law 
when the police themselves claim that the arrest or evidence seizure was 
performed legally.  This would be a tall order even with an ordinary 
witness – the defense must find a way to prove to the judge that the 
sworn witness is lying or is not credible.  Now, imagine the testimony is 
offered by a police officer, a repeat player in the system, with the 
implicit and explicit credibility that his office entails, combined with the 
institutional and systemic bias in favor of his credibility.24  On the other 
side is an accused defendant, often with a criminal history, who is facing 
prison if the evidence is admitted or the arrest is allowed.  It is not hard 
to imagine which story a judge will be inclined to believe, particularly 
when the entire case against the defendant may rise or fall on the 
outcome of the suppression hearing.  Not surprisingly, defendants rarely 
win at suppression hearings,25 despite reams of evidence that police 
routinely violate defendants’ rights.26 
 
In these instances, then, it is critical that a defense attorney have 
access to the testifying officer’s disciplinary record for several reasons.  
A disciplinary record may reveal similar bad behavior by the officer in 
past cases.  Here is one example: in many drug cases, an officer will 
claim that the defendant dropped the narcotics he possessed on the street 
just as the officer was arresting him.  The defendant, however, may 
claim that the police dropped the illegal drugs on the street, picked them 
up, and then used that to arrest, search, and discover more drugs on the 
defendant’s body.  This may seem far-fetched, but anecdotal research 
shows that these “dropsy” cases happen more often than we would like 
to think,27 particularly where officers believe that a suspect possesses 
narcotics but lack reasonable suspicion to search him.  A disciplinary 
record that shows numerous past complaints of illegal searches related to 
                                                
24 Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, supra note 20  at 1464. 
25 Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1, 20 (2001) (“studies have consistently found that successful suppression motions 
are quite rare.”). 
26 Floyd e.g. 
27 See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the 
Prosecution, 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 315, 324 (2005) (noting that “dropsy” testimony 
began after the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution and that such testimony 
should be, but is not, viewed with suspicion); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 
Emory L.J. 1311, 1318 (1994) (noting the troubling “repetition of this suspicious story 
in case after case that suggests fabrication” but the paucity of examples where such 
testimony is disbelieved).  
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drugs would be extremely relevant to a suppression hearing in a dropsy 
case.  Yet defense lawyers are routinely denied access to such records, 
and the stated intent of the New York law is to prevent the records from 
being used in this way. 
 
Those in favor of preventing defense access to disciplinary 
records might argue that the defense will use irrelevant, unsubstantiated 
allegations to jam up legitimate cases, besmirch the reputation of honest 
officers, and taint the factfinders’ impression of the testifying officers’ 
credibility.  Police union representatives go even further, claiming that 
“making detailed personal information available to convicted criminals 
will potentially put our officers and their families at risk.”28  These 
arguments are unconvincing.  First, a judge, either at a suppression 
hearing or a jury trial, is fully competent to weigh the prejudicial versus 
probative impact of police disciplinary records. This is the type of 
balancing a judge does with evidence offered to impeach the credibility 
of any witness.  Second, the institutional biases in favor of police officers 
are so strong that it is hard to imagine even credible, substantiated 
disciplinary infractions dramatically changing the number of cases where 
evidence is suppressed or where a defendant is acquitted.  Finally, there 
is no evidence or reason to suspect that making police disciplinary 
records available to defense attorneys will make officers and their 
families less safe.  While police officers face difficult and dangerous 
situations as part of their jobs, officer safety cannot be used to defeat 
legitimate legal arguments in favor of criminal defendants.  If, somehow, 
an officer’s safety will be at risk based on something in his record, a 
judge is competent to make that determination and redact that portion of 
the record.  
 
II. Releasing Police Records to the Public 
 
Thus, the reason behind New York’s law protecting police 
officers’ privacy is the worst defense of the law.  Some have used this to 
argue that the law should be repealed entirely.29  This, I believe, is a 
mistake.  While police officers are public servants, which makes 
transparency central to their accountability, that principle must be 
weighed against the equally important principle of individual privacy.  
                                                
28 Brenda J. Lyons, State Committee Urges Cuomo, Legislators to Open Police Files 
TimesUnion, (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Report-says-
police-files-should-be-open-to-public-5967527.php#page-1. 
29 See, e.g., Daniel Denver, New York’s police secrecy law: de Blasio fights to keep 
NYPD abuse records from the public, Salon (June 29, 2016) (noting that “the 
Committee on Open Government, an independent state agency, called for the 
legislature to make repealing or reforming 50-a a priority.”). 
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While this should hold little sway when the accountability is to a 
criminal defendant facing the loss of liberty, we should be much more 
careful when the call is to expose disciplinary records to the public.  
Take the case of Officer Pantaleo.  There is much to the argument that he 
should have been indicted by a Staten Island jury, but he was not.  Yet he 
is currently under investigation by a federal grand jury.  While this 
investigation is ongoing, the publicity of his record might well taint the 
jury’s consideration of the charges against him, the same way publicity 
of facts against any defendant might impact a jury considering her fate. 
The frustrations of community members who see police act with 
impunity is wholly justified, but publicly shaming a criminal suspect 
who may be indicted by a grand jury is a short-term strategy that does 
little to rectify the problematic culture which leads to police brutality.30   
 
More globally, we should be asking ourselves what implications 
flow from the argument that all police disciplinary records should be 
made public.  As discussed above, some of the allegations against an 
officer will likely be false, or at least unsubstantiated.  The public does 
not have the mandate or the institutional competence that a judge or 
lawyer might have when considering different levels of complaint-
substantiation.  Perhaps even more importantly, the knowledge that 
records will be made public will affect how complaints are dealt with by 
those charged with investigating officers.  The CCRB or the internal 
investigators in a police department may decline to vigorously 
investigate charges against an officer if they believe that whatever they 
discover will be laid bare.  Police departments are already notoriously 
hesitant to fire bad officers,31 and will be even less likely to do so if 
incentives exist for an officer’s misconduct to go unrecorded.  This holds 
not just for officers who commit violent arrests or brutalize citizens, but 
also for those officers who show their unfitness in other ways – racism or 
sexism toward other officers, alcohol or drug related problems on the 
job, allegations of dishonest overtime reports, and countless other ways 
in which an officer might show himself unfit to serve the public long 
before he does something outwardly violent to a citizen.  We need to 
strengthen the internal control over police officers and, while 
transparency may help to force police departments to fire the worst 
officers, it may also retard their efforts to collect information on their 
employees, cause them to circle wagons even more tightly, and give 
them another reason to refuse to engage with the community.  
                                                
30 Cf. Police Suspects, supra note 6 (arguing that rather than strip police of 
specialized interrogation rights, we think about how extending those rights to all 
suspects might aid in criminal justice reform).  
31 See, e.g., Mike Riggs, Why Firing A Bad Cop is Damn Near Impossible, REASON 
(Oct. 19, 2012).  
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Moreover, all government employees benefit from privacy 
protections that stop their records from becoming public.32  While it is 
certainly possible to argue that the police serve a unique function in our 
society that makes their record-transparency particularly important, it is 
not far-fetched to assume that transparency-related arguments could be 
made in favor of publicizing the records of public school teachers, public 
university employees, firefighters, doctors and nurses who work at 
publicly funded hospitals, and a whole host of other employees.  At some 
early point in the debate over the publication of officer records, we must 
consider how such arguments affect other government and government-
funded employees.  
 
Part III.  Police Records as Criminal Records 
 
There are also criminal justice-related legal and policy concerns 
lurking just downstream from the question of police privacy matters.  
The privacy versus transparency debate impacts another, far less 
institutionally powerful group of individuals whose lives are constantly 
affected by the specter of public-outing:  formerly incarcerated 
individuals.  Whether, how, and for how long to publicize the criminal 
records of those who have served their sentences and are attempting to 
reintegrate into society are questions that scholars and politicians are 
addressing in several forms.33  Recent academic literature, with notable 
exceptions,34 tends to come down squarely on the side of more privacy 
for these individuals.35  
                                                
32 There are far too many privacy-related statutes to mention here but two examples 
should serve. New York Civil Rights Law section 50, protects not just police records, 
but also the records of firefighters, paramedics, and probation officers.  Additionally, 
federal employees’ records are protected by federal statute.  Under 5 C.F.R. Part 
293.311, other than basic identifying information, a federal employee’s information is 
not released to any party without a summons, warrant, or subpoena. 
33 See, e.g., Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Beth Avery, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, 
Counties, and States Adopt Fair Hiring Policies, Nat’l Employment Law Project (Apr. 
1, 2017), http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-
local-guide (describing various reforms implemented to protect formerly incarcerated 
peoples’ records). 
34 James Jacobs, Is Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders Immoral, The 
Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 2, 2015) (arguing employers should have access to criminal 
records because “more information is always preferable to less information.”) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/02/is-
employment-discrimination-against-ex-offenders-immoral. 
35 See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law (forthcoming Cardozo L. Rev.) 
(impact of criminal record on hiring decisions), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2944840; Eisha Jain, Prosecuting 
Collateral Consequences, 104 Geo. L.J. 1197, 1198 (2016) (considering prosecutors’ 
role in collateral consequences of criminal record). 
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Formerly incarcerated private citizens are haunted by their 
criminal records for decades after they complete their sentences. 36  
Criminal records are used to deny them food stamps, housing, and voting 
rights.37  But more importantly for purposes of this essay, they are made 
available to employers, educational institutions, and professional 
organizations.38  The argument for publicizing these records is that the 
public has a right to know if someone has been convicted of a crime and 
to make a decision about that person’s employability, institutional 
competency, and dangerousness based on those records.  Critics of 
publicizing criminal records argue that they often provide little accurate 
information about a person but are almost insurmountable obstacles to 
achieving full reintegration into society.  They become a perpetual 
punishment in the form of lack of access to civil society long after a 
person’s punishment is meant to be over. 
 
The arguments in favor of making officer disciplinary records 
public are undeniably similar to those for criminal records.  As a police 
officer, one gives up her right to privacy because the public has a right to 
know whether or not she is fit to be an officer.  While there are major 
differences to be sure between police disciplinary records and criminal 
records, further inquiry may find that the arguments in favor of 
transparency and privacy are equally compelling and equally overstated 
for each.39   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this essay was twofold:  to address the backward 
nature of New York’s police record privacy law, and to begin to raise 
questions about how police disciplinary records should be handled more 
broadly.  How we protect or expose the behavior of police reveals much 
about our commitment to privacy and transparency not only for police, 
but for other government employees, and for all those affected or 
involved in the vast and record-thick criminal justice system.  
 
  
                                                
36 Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death:  Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1790 (2012) (collateral consequences for “tens of 
millions” with criminal records).  
37 Id. at 1799-1803. 
38 Levin, supra note 35, at passim (employment, though critical to reintegration, is 
made very difficult for those with criminal records).  
39 This is the subject of a future project.  Here I merely suggest that inquiry could lead 
to important similarities.   
